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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from the employment relationship between Plaintiff-Appellant 
Tina Venable (hereinafter "Venable"), in her status as employee, and Defendant-
Respondent Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. (hereinafter "Internet Auto"), in its status as 
employer. This appeal implicates Venable's claim for wrongful discharge of 
employment in violation of public policy. See Count Two of the First Amended 
Complaint, R., Vol. I, p. 285. More specifically, Venable contends she was wrongfully 
terminated for first reporting her observations that Internet Auto was violating the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act (sometimes hereinafter the "Act"), and then for her refusal to 
commit or to participate in the commitment of violations of the Act. See Idaho Code § 
48-60 I , et seq. 
The remainder of this brief shall demonstrate that the grant of summary judgment 
111 favor of Internet Auto was not an appropriate resolution of Venable's claim for 
wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Venable filed her original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on October 6, 
2011, in Ada County, Idaho. R., Vol. I, pp. 15-22. It contained the following causes of 
action: (1) Breach of the Employment Contract and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing Implied Therein; (2) Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy; and (3) 
the IntentionallNegligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. Id. Internet Auto filed 
Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial on April 11,2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 23-30. Thereafter, on August 28,2012, Venable 
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filed her First Amended Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial. R., Vol. I, pp. 281-288. 
The First Amended Complaint added a fourth cause of action for Slander Per Se. Id. It 
was Answered by Internet Auto on September 7,2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 300-305. 
Even before the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Internet Auto had moved 
the district court for summary judgment on July 10, 2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 29-30. Its 
motion was accompanied by the Affidavit of Phillip S. Oberrecht in Support of Defendant 
Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 31-33), 
the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 185-201), and the Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts in Support of Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment CR., Vol. I., pp. 202-209). In opposition to summary judgment, Venable 
lodged her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R., Vol. 1, pp. 257-269), supported by the Affidavit of 
Sam Johnson in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 227-229), 
Thereafter, the district court granted Internet Auto's motion for summary 
jUdgment on the claim for breach of contract, the claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, but denied the motion with respect to the claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress by way of Memorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated September 12,2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 
306-316. More particular to this appeal, as to the cause of action for wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy, the district court reserved ruling until further discovery 
could be completed. Id. at p. 315. 
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After further discovery, on December 27, 2012, Venable filed her Affidavit of 
Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Claim for Wrongfitl Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. R., 
Vol. I, pp. 336-340. It incorporated as exhibits excerpts from Venable's deposition 
transcript, the Affidavit of Robert William Heath, and excerpts from the deposition 
transcript of witness Joey Winter. Id. After hearing, the district court granted summary 
judgment to Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy on January 30, 2013. See Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment Denying for Count IV and Granting for 
Count IL at R, Vol. I, pp. 372-382. 
Next, on February 6, 20l3, Venable filed Plaint(ff's Motion and Memorandum for 
Reconsideration of the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for Wrongful 
Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. R., Vol. I, pp. 383-393. It was denied by the 
district court on February 27,2013. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
Summary Judgment on Count II, at R, Vol. I, pp. 409-416. 
The matter proceeded to trial on Venable's claims for slander per se, and the 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Internet 
Auto on both of these remaining counts, on March 15,2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 420-424. 
Shortly after trial, Venable filed Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of 
Public Policy. R., Vol. I, pp. 427-430. It was based upon the sworn testimony "proffered 
from witnesses Chris Plaza, Robert Heath, and Tina Venable during the jury trial which 
commenced on March 11, 2013." Id. at p. 428. The district court denied the motion by 
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Order Denying Plaintiff's Second Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment on Count II 
R., Vol. I, pp. 437-444. 
Venable timely filed her Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2013. R., Vol. 1, pp. 444-
448. A First Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 5, 2013. R., Vol. 1, pp. 
456-462. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about March 15, 20 11, the parties entered into a contract of 
employment, whereby Venable was hired to fill the position of "Internet Manager" for 
Internet Auto. See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at R., Vol. I, p. 
282. 
2. Before starting her employment with Internet Auto, Venable had 
spent much of her adult life working in the automobile sales industry, where she had been 
employed by new and used car dealerships, for whom she had held a variety of 
management level positions. Over the years, Venable had received training in every 
aspect of the business model, including sales and sales management, finance and finance 
management, warranty coverage, gap insurance, lender acquisition fees, and business 
ethics. Altogether Venable has accumulated roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in 
the auto sales industry. R., Vol. I, p. 337. 
3. Based upon her roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in auto 
sales, Venable understood and believed in good faith that the following acts and practices 
she observed at the dealership were in violation of not only industry standards but also in 
violation of the Idaho consumer protection act and/or the Truth in Lending Act: 
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a. Internet Auto illegally passed on acqulSltlOn fees to consumers 
which were in fact owed by the dealership and then illegally 
charged the consumer interest thereon; 
b. Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties in transactions 
where the consumer was purchasing the vehicle in the "As Is" 
condition; 
c. Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in transactions 
where the consumer opted out of gap coverage; 
d. Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" which did not 
even exist in the inventory and falsely misrepresented the history 
of pre-owned vehicles to consumers; 
e. Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers III excess of their 
advertised prices; 
f. Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of failing to 
disclose all material contractual and financial terms to consumers, 
engaging in what is known in the industry as "packed payments"; 
g. Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the dealership had 
agreed to lower the sales price of units when in fact it had only 
extended the term of the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly 
payment amount disclosed to the consumer; 
h. Internet Auto further deceived consumers by employing a variety 
of "bait and switch" tactics designed to trick consumers into 
believing they were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it 
later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value; 
R., Vol. I, pp. 337-38. 
4. Venable's deposition was taken in this matter on June 5, 2012. R., 
Vol. I, p. 338. During her deposition, Venable testified from her personal knowledge 
and observations as an employee of Internet Auto, how the dealership engaged in the 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices listed above. Jd. 
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5. The sworn statements contained in the Affidavit of Robert William 
Heath corroborate the existence of the deceptive practices Venable has described 
above. R., Vol. I, pp. 354-357. Mr. Heath averred in his affidavit that: 
During the time of my employment at Internet Auto Rent & 
Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza instructed us to 
sell packed payments to customers. The practice of selling 
packed payments involved charging customers extra for 
warranties and gap insurance that the customers had no 
knowledge of. We were also told to charge higher prices 
for cars than the prices listed in the adveIiisements on the 
internet, when a customer had not seen the advertised price. 
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed us to 
pass on acquisition fees to customers which were charged 
by lending institutions in subprime transactions and were to 
be paid directly by the dealership to the lender. He further 
instructed us to include the transaction fee charged in credit 
card transactions in with the purchase price; 
Chris Plaza also directed us to put customers in cars even 
though we knew through our experience in the industry the 
buyer would not likely qualify for a loan, but this way the 
customer was able to drive the car off the lot and take it 
home. Then the dealership would contact the buyer a few 
days later and explain the deal fell through and therefore 
the buyer had to return the car. Upon the buyer's return of 
the car to the dealership, we were instructed to switch the 
buyer into a different car which would bring a higher return 
to the dealership. Buyers often felt obliged to buy the 
substituted car so as to avoid any embmTassment associated 
with having a new car to having no car at all; 
Internet Auto Rent & Sales would also advertise units for 
sale in Boise when the car was not within the Boise 
inventory, but may have been sitting on the lot in Reno or 
Winnemucca. The ads however clearly depicted the car to 
be on the lot in Boise; 
Chris Plaza recognized many of Internet Auto Rent & Sales 
customers were in desperate need to secure some form of 
transportation, and so he directed us to take advantage of 
the situation by employing the tactics referenced above and 
others. If we did not go along with his tactics, he would 
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start to take away our access to computer programs, and 
our access to work deals and gain approval for deals; 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
6. Venable reported the occurrence of the above acts and practices to 
the General Sales Manager, Mr. Chris Plaza, and other members of the management team 
but was first told that she should mind her own business and was later told that this is 
how "we do business" and to get on board or words to that affect. R., Vol. I, p. 338-339. 
7. Shortly after reporting the deceptive acts and practices to Mr. 
Plaza, Venable discovered that her access to key programs used by the dealership had 
been denied which made it more difficult for her to complete sales transactions on behalf 
ofInternet Auto. R., Vol. I, p. 339. 
8. On or about April 21, 2011, Venable's employment relationship 
with Internet Auto was terminated. Venable contends she was fired because she refused 
to break the law. Id. 
9. The sworn testimony of Mr. Joey Winter taken in this matter on 
December 11, 2012, likewise corroborates Venable's claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy. Mr. Winter was also employed by Internet Auto during the 
term of Venable's employment with the dealership. Id. Mr. Winter held a management 
position with Internet Auto. Id. 
10. Mr. Winter testified from personal knowledge how he recalled that 
Venable had made reports to Mr. Plaza about the existence of improper conduct 
occurring at the dealership. See Winter Depo. Tr., p. 65, L. 13 - p. 66, L. 3 at R., Vol. I, 
p.368. 
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11. Mr. Winter further testified how it was Mr. Plaza who barred 
Venable's access to computer programs used at the dealership. See Winter Depo. Tr., p. 
75, L. 7 - p. 76, L. 23 at R., Vol. I, p. 371; 
12. Mr. Winter also confirmed that it was Mr. Plaza who instructed 
Mr. Winter to fire Venable. Winter Depo. Tr., p. 68, LI. 4-19 at R. Vol. I, p. 369. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in 
favor of the DefendantlRespondent on Plaintiff/Appellant's claim for 
wrongful discharge of employment in violation of public policy. 
B. Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant's 
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the grant of summary 
judgment on the claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy based upon evidence adduced during the jury trial on the 
related Slander Per Se Claim. 
C. Whether Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment/Reconsideration. 
"When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same 
standard employed by the trial cOUl1 when deciding such a motion." Nation v. State, 
Dept. o/Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 184, 158 P.3d 953,960 (2007); see also Sorenson v. 
St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 758, 118 P.3d 86, 90 (2005). Thus, 
the following standard of review applies on this appeal: 
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all 
times upon the moving party. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 
P.2d at 364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868, 452 P.2d at 365. This 
burden is onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can 
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create a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 
769, 820 P.2d at 364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868, 452 P.2d at 
365. 
Harris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 
(1992). 
"[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving 
party." Ashley v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 
404 (1979). The motion must be denied "if the evidence is 
such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and 
if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions." 
Id. 
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) . 
. . . [T]he Court must liberally construe facts in the eXlstmg 
record in favor of the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable 
inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Thompson, 126 Idaho at 529, 887 P.2d at 1036; Bonz v. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 
360, 364 (1991). If there are conflicting inferences contained in 
the record or reasonable minds might reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Bonz, 119 
Idaho at 541, 808 P .2d at 878. 
State v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 356, 924 P.2d 615, 618 (1996). 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P .3d 
891, 895 (2007); Carnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 651, 658 
(2002). When considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2), the district 
court should take into account any new facts or information presented by the moving 
party bearing on the correctness of the district court's order. Coeur d' Alene Mining Co. 
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v. First Nat'l Bank of N Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The 
moving party carries the burden of either bringing new facts to the attention of the court 
or drawing the court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473,147 P.3d 100,105 (Ct. App. 2006). 
B. The District Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
Internet Auto on Venable's Claim for Wrongful Discharge of 
Employment in Violation of Public Policy. 
1. Idaho recognizes a narrow exception to "at-will" 
employment when the employer's motivation for the 
termination contravenes public policy. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized a narrow exception to at-will 
employment where the employer's motivation for the termination contravenes public 
policy. Van v. PortneufMed Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009); see 
also Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977). In 
order for the public policy exception to apply, the discharged employee must show she 
was telminated for engaging in protected activity, which includes: (1) refusing to commit 
an unlawful act; (2) performing an important public obligation; or (3) exercising certain 
rights or privileges. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-
641,272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 
799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). The public policy at issue generally must be rooted in the 
constitution, case law or statutory language. Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 
Idaho 172, 177, 75 P.3d 733, 738 (2003). Whether an employee is engaged in protected 
activity is a question of law. Bollinger at 640-641, 272 P.3d at 1272. To determine 
whether activity is protected, this Court analyzes (1) whether there is a public policy at 
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stake sufficient to create an exception to at-will employment, and (2) whether the 
employee acted in furtherance of that policy. Id. 
As discussed below, Venable placed in the record sufficient evidence touching on all 
elements of her claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to overcome 
summary judgment. 
2. Venable adequately identified the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act as a sufficient source of public policy for 
creating an exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine. 
Venable adequately identified the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as the source of 
public policy which invokes the narrow exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine 
recognized in Idaho. In fact, in paragraph nine (9) of both the original and first amended 
complaint, Venable cited directly to the Act. Both complaints read as follows: 
Plaintiff, in fact, reported her observations of several 
business acts and practices she believed violated the rights 
of consumers/lenders under the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act, Idaho Code § 48-601, et seq., .... (Emphasis added). 
Id. at R., VoL I, p. 17, and R., VoL I, p. 283. Yet, the district court erred by only 
crediting Venable for citing to Idaho Code § 48-601 of the Act, and not the Act as a 
whole, when it noted: 
Significantly, Idaho Code § 48-601 simply defines the title 
and purpose of the ICPA .. " As a matter of law, these 
general references when coupled with the failure to identify 
specifically violated regulations or laws are insufficient to 
show that Venable was engaged in protected activity. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9. 
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Idaho Code § 48-601 is important in its own right because it identifies the purpose 
behind the Act, and it is well settled that the public policy exception to "at-will" 
employment must be rooted in the constitution, case law or statutory language. See 
Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 177, 75 P.3d 733, 738 (2003); 
see also Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 1263, 
1272 (2012). But Venable, nevertheless, cited to the Act as a whole which would 
encompass all other sections of the Act, including § 48-603 which reads in part: 
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or 
commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful, .... 
(Emphasis added). 
Venable further identified the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as the policy-basis 
of her employment law claim by moving the district court to take judicial notice of the 
same. R., Vol. I, pp. 317-319. In her request for judicial notice, Venable asked this 
Court to take: 
Judicial notice of the fact that the Idaho legislature has 
enacted certain legislation which "shall be known and may 
be cited as the' Idaho consumer protection act. '" See Idaho 
Code § 48-601, et seq. Further, that when adopting the 
Idaho consumer protection act, the Idaho legislature 
declared certain acts or practices to be unlawful in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce and such acts are 
cun-ently set forth under Idaho Code § 48-603. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. Although the district court denied taking judicial notice, the fact Venable further 
identified the statutory source of her public policy claim by making the request remains a 
matter of record in the lower court. Id. 
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The Idaho Consumer Protection Act is undoubtedly designed to protect 
consumers against unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or 
commerce. Venable has unmistakably identified said Act and its various sections as the 
source of public policy giving rise to her claim for wrongful discharge. As such, the facts 
of this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented in the case of Bollinger v. 
Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 1263 (2012), a case which 
the district court cited as, "illustrative for this Court." See Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting in part Summary Judgment, at R., Vol. I, p. 380. In Bollinger, the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
Bollinger's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment 
only vaguely asserts that Case "refused to implement or to 
follow safety rules and regulations of which [Bollinger] 
made him aware . . . and ignored requirements for 
equipment; procedures; and regulations." Nowhere in her 
briefing below or on appeal does Bollinger identify a legal 
source for those alleged rules and regulations. 
A closer look at the record reveals little more. Although 
Bollinger mentions OSHA generally in her deposition 
testimony, she never associates any of her complaints with 
specific OSHA regulations. She only mentions that the 
safety clothing she requested funding for was required by 
the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), but that code 
is not legally binding on Fall River. In fact, she 
specifically states that OSHA had not adopted requirements 
for the clothing at the time of her report. 
Id. at Idah0642 (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Bollinger, the plaintiff cited to NESC, a code with which the employer 
was not legally bound to comply. Id. The plaintiff in Bollinger also cited to OSHA, but 
ultimately admitted that OSHA had not adopted any applicable safety requirements 
during the relevant time frame. Id. The plaintiffs failings in Bollinger have not been 
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repeated by Venable here. Rather, Venable has repeatedly identified the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act as the source of public policy which protects the consumer by making it 
unlawful for Internet Auto to engage in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, the type 
of which have been complained of here. It is axiomatic that Internet Auto was required 
to comply with the Idaho Consumer Protection Act during Venable's employment; this is 
a major distinction from Bollinger. 
Unfortunately, the district court failed to appreciate the distinguishing 
characteristics in this matter from those presented in Bollinger which caused the district 
court to erroneously find Venable had not engaged in protected activity. 
3. Venable has produced substantive evidence showing how 
the unfair and deceptive acts and practices were unlawful 
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Venable produced substantive evidence demonstrating multiple violations of the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Nonetheless, the district court when ruling on summary 
judgment, concluded: 
Beyond these vague references, Venable has offered no 
citations or argument as to how the alleged conduct 
violated the above provisions other than broad statements 
that it was somehow illegal without any specific detail or 
authority. General mention of laws or regulations will not 
survive summary judgment. In short, even with these 
undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in Venable's 
favor, she has failed to produce evidence or show how the 
alleged acts were in any way unlawful. 
R. Vol. I, p. 381. 
Venable respectfully disagreed with the district court's conclusion that she failed 
to produce evidence or show how the allegedly deceptive acts were unlawful. The record 
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speaks for itself along these lines. Venable, in her own affidavit, specified the very 
conduct she believed violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act: 
Based upon my roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in 
auto sales, I understood and believed in good faith that the 
following acts and practices I observed at the dealership 
were in violation of not only industry standards but also in 
violation of the Idaho consumer protection act and/or the 
Truth in Lending Act: 
a. Internet Auto illegally passed on acquisition fees to 
consumers which were in fact owed by the 
dealership and then illegally charged the consumer 
interest thereon; 
b. Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties 
in transactions where the consumer was purchasing 
the vehicle in the "As Is" condition; 
c. Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in 
transactions where the consumer opted out of gap 
coverage; 
d. Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" 
which did not even exist in the inventory and falsely 
misrepresented the history of pre-owned vehicles to 
consumers; 
e. Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers in excess 
of their advertised prices; 
f. Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of 
failing to disclose all material contractual and 
financial terms to consumers, engaging in what is 
known in the industrv as "packed payments"; 
g. Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the 
dealership had agreed to lower the sales price of 
units when in fact it had only extended the term of 
the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly payment 
amount disclosed to the consumer; 
h. Internet Auto further deceived consumers by 
employing a variety of "bait and switch" tactics 
designed to trick consumers into believing they 
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were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it 
later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value; 
R., Vol. I, pp. 337-338 (emphasis added). 
In her same affidavit, Venable cited to her earlier deposition transcript where she 
testified from her own personal knowledge as an employee of Internet Auto about how 
the dealership engaged in the unfair and deceptive acts identified above, and referenced 
the specific pages of the transcript where such testimony could be found by the district 
court. R., Vol. I, p. 338. 
Venable also cited to the Affidavit of Robert William Heath as providing further 
testimony in corroboration of her own that the dealership engaged in deceptive and unfair 
acts and practices. R, Vol. I, pp. 354-357. Mr. Heath averred in his affidavit that: 
During the time of my employment at Internet Auto 
Rent & Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza 
instructed us to sell packed payments to customers. The 
practice of selling packed payments involved charging 
customers extra for warranties and gap insurance that the 
customers had no knowledge of. We were also told to 
charge higher prices for cars than the prices listed in the 
advertisements on the internet, when a customer had not 
seen the advertised price. 
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed 
us to pass on acquisition fees to customers which were 
charged by lending institutions in subprime transactions 
and were to be paid directly by the dealership to the lender. 
He further instructed us to include the transaction fee 
charged in credit card transactions in with the purchase 
pnce; 
Chris Plaza also directed us to put customers in cars 
even though we knew through our experience in the 
industry the buyer would not likely qualify for a loan, but 
this way the customer was able to drive the car off the lot 
and take it home. Then the dealership would contact the 
buyer a few days later and explain the deal fell through and 
therefore the buyer had to return the car. Upon the buyer's 
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return of the car to the dealership, we were instructed to 
switch the buyer into a different car which would bring a 
higher return to the dealership. Buyers often felt obliged to 
buy the substituted car so as to avoid any embarrassment 
associated with having a new car to having no car at all; 
Internet Auto Rent & Sales would also advertise 
units for sale in Boise when the car was not within the 
Boise inventory, but may have been sitting on the lot in 
Reno or Winnemucca. The ads however clearly depicted 
the car to be on the lot in Boise; 
Chris Plaza recognized many of Internet Auto Rent 
& Sales customers were in desperate need to secure some 
form of transportation, and so he directed us to take 
advantage of the situation by employing the tactics 
referenced above and others. If we did not go along with 
his tactics, he would start to take away our access to 
computer programs, and our access to work deals and gain 
approval for deals. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
The essence of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is to protect consumers from 
falling prey to unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade. That is 
manifest in the title and purpose of the Act as set out in Idaho Code § 48-601, and in 
Idaho Code § 48-603, which makes such acts unlawful, and in § 48-603(17), which 
speaks to the scope of the Act by making it illegal for commercial enterprises to engage 
in any activity which is misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer. 
Venable has clearly and adequately identified the source of her claim for public 
policy and has demonstrated the manner in which Internet Auto has violated the letter and 
spirit of the public policy embedded in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by citing the 
district court to the provisions in the Act listed above. Many of the acts committed by the 
dealership as reflected in the record no doubt violated other provisions set forth in the 
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Act, including Idaho Code § 48-603(2), § 48-603(4), and § 48-603(9). These sections 
respectively ban acts causing confusion as to the source and approval of financing, ban 
the use of deceptive designations of geographic origin, and ban the advertising of goods 
with the intent not to sell them as advertised. Id. 
Accordingly, the district court committed reversible error when concluding "even 
with these undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in Venable's favor, she has 
failed to produce evidence or show how the alleged acts were in any way unlawful." R. 
Vol. I, p. 381. 
4. Venable has shown she engaged in activity protected by the 
public policy exception to the "at-will" doctrine. 
As noted above, Venable must show she was terminated for engaging in protected 
activity, which includes: (1) refusing to commit an unlawful act; (2) performing an 
important public obligation; or (3) exercising certain rights or privileges. Bollinger v. 
fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., lnc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-641, 272 P.3d 1263,1271-1272 
(2012); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668 (1990). 
Venable has made the proper showing. First, there is no question that Venable was 
hired to fill the position of Internet Manager on March 15, 2011. There is no question 
that just a short time later Venable was involuntarily terminated by Internet Auto on April 
21, 2011. In between her date of hire and her date of termination, the record 
unequivocally reflects Venable reported to Internet Auto the fact the dealership was 
engaging in deceptive and unlawful acts and practices in violation of Idaho law. In fact, 
Venable testified how she "complained loudly and boldly" about very specific tactics the 
dealership used to deceive its customers. R., Vol. I, p. 259. During her deposition, 
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Venable documented and discussed the manner in which the dealership carried out the 
unlawful and deceptive acts and practices. R., Vol. I, p. 260. Internet Auto has not 
challenged Venable's reporting and the existence of these acts and practices with any 
specific, objective evidence. 
Internet Auto repeatedly told Venable that: "This is how we do business" and to "Get 
on board." R., Vol. I, p. 338. When Venable refused, the dealership first suspended 
Venable's access to key programs which infringed on her ability to realize sales, and then 
finally terminated her employment at the dealership. R., Vol. I, p. 339. During her 
deposition, Venable succinctly stated the grounds of her termination "They fired me 
because I refused to break the law." R., Vol. I, p. 261. 
When applying the standard on summary judgment to the facts of record, Venable 
clearly presented a viable claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The 
fact Venable reported and refused to commit the unlawful acts of violating customers' 
rights under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act could not be clearer from the record on 
appeal. Venable's refusal to commit unlawful acts presents a well recognized exception 
to at-will employment, as does her fulfillment of performing the important public 
function of reporting such violations to management at Internet Auto. Sorensen v. Comm 
Tek, inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). There is no doubt that the public 
policy at stake here is rooted in the statutory framework of state law. The state of Idaho 
has a strong public policy interest in protecting consumers and lenders from unlawful 
business acts and practices. The public policy is manifest in the enactment of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. Here, Venable plainly acted in furtherance of the sound public 
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policy at issue. Venable spoke out about the unlawful acts and practices and ultimately 
sacrificed her livelihood by refusing, herself, to engage in such activity. 
Venable has furthermore shown that her termination was in fact motivated by her 
reporting of and refusal to commit illegal acts. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized 
the question of causation is generally one for the jury. See Bollinger v. Fall River Elec. 
Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-641, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012). The temporal 
relationship between Venable's reporting of the unlawful acts and her refusal to get on 
board with such tactics, coupled with her involuntary termination alone gives rise to jury 
questions. In other words, a jury could reasonably infer from the surrounding 
circumstances that the motivation for the termination derived from Venable's refusal to 
"break the law." Under the fact pattern of this case, based upon the summary judgment 
standard, district courts are really not at liberty to accept as true the employer's position 
that the employee was fired for some other legitimate reason. Van v. Portneuf Med. 
Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). This legal principle holds true 
here since Internet Auto's given reason for the termination makes no sense. On the 
termination form, it reflects the discharge was due to "services no longer needed." R., 
Vol. I, p. 261. Under the facts of this case, Internet Auto's stated reason for the 
termination smacks of pretext. Venable had been hired to fill the position of Internet 
Manager on March 15, 2011, and fired just a short time later because her services were 
no longer needed. How could Venable's services no longer be needed in such a short 
time after her date of hire? It is not as though Internet Auto shut down its internet 
department. Then, later on during the unemployment proceedings, Internet Auto's basis 
for the termination shifts from services no longer needed to not meeting sales goals. R., 
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Vol. I, p. 261. In other words, Internet Auto's stated basis for the termination shifted 
from non-performance-based to performance-based reasons, when it asserted its position 
before the Idaho Department of Labor. Id. Most assuredly, a sufficient record has been 
made by Venable to send the issue of causation to a jury. 
Accordingly, Internet Auto's motion for summary judgment respecting the claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy should not have been granted by the 
district court. 
C. The District Court Erred in Denying Venable's Second Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for 
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy based upon Evidence 
adduced during the Jury Trial on the related Slander Per Se Claim. 
After the jury trial, Venable filed her second motion for reconsideration 
concerning her claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based, in part, 
upon the trial testimony of witness Chris Plaza. R., Vol. I, pp. 427-430. At trial, Chris 
Plaza confirmed he was the General Sales Manager for Internet Auto during Venable's 
term of employment there. Tr., p. 321, Ll. 11-21. Mr. Plaza clearly testified that it would 
"Absolutely" be considered a deceptive business practice to pass acquisition fees onto 
customers without the customer's knowledge. Tr., p. 347, Ll. 7-19. When ruling on the 
second motion for reconsideration, the district court acknowledged the foregoing 
testimony proffered by Mr. Plaza: "Mr. Plaza testified that passing on such acquisition 
fees would be deceptive, and that packing payments would be deceptive or unethical." 
R., Vol. I, p. 440. Mr. Plaza's trial testimony coupled with the sworn testimony of Mr. 
Heath, previously cited above and reiterated here, no doubt confirms the district court 
should have granted Venable's second motion for reconsideration: 
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During the time of my employment at Internet Auto Rent & 
Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza instructed us to 
sell packed payments to customers. The practice of selling 
packed payments involved charging customers extra for 
warranties and gap insurance that the customers had no 
knowledge of. We were also told to charge higher prices 
for cars than the prices listed in the advertisements on the 
internet, when a customer had not seen the advertised price. 
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed us to 
pass on acquisition fees to customers which were charged 
by lending institutions in subprime transactions and were to 
be paid directly by the dealership to the lender. He further 
instructed us to include the transaction fee charged in credit 
card transactions in with the purchase price. 
R., Vol. I, p. 355 (emphasis added). 
The district court committed clear error in denying Venable's second motion for 
reconsideration. 
D. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Venable is entitled to recover her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3). This section allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in commercial transactions. "Actions brought for breach of an 
employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the 
attorney fee provision ofLC. § 12-120(3)." Willie v. Bd. Of Trs. , 138 Idaho 131, 136,59 
P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (citing Northwest Bec Corp., 136 Idaho 835, 842, P.3d 263, 270 
(2002); Treasure Valley Gastrenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 492, 
20 P.3d 21, 28 (Ct. App. 2001). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 22 
CONCLUSION 
Venable respectfully seeks a reversal of the district court's order granting 
summary judgment to Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge III 
violation of the public policy embodied in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
DATED: This ;).~ day of October, 2013. 
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